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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, the Sixth Circuit upheld the removal of a 
resident based on a violation of a vague immigration statute.1 The Sixth 
Circuit’s decision does not give a definition to the statute, however, but brings 
into question statutory construction as the court based its decision on Chevron 
deference.2 Both the majority and spirited dissent by Judge Sutton express a 
doctrinal argument over the proper relationship between the rule of lenity and 
Chevron deference when a statute has criminal and civil liability. In this case, 
Juan Esquivel-Quintana, a permanent resident, violated a California statute for 
“unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.”3 For that violation, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) found him removable from the United States 
under federal law.4 This decision, when appealed to the Sixth Circuit, led to 
the entanglement of two important values—between reading laws with 
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 1 Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 2 Id. at 1021. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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criminal ramifications strictly, and deferring to agencies entitled to enforce the 
law. 
The rule of lenity, which requires ambiguous criminal statutes to be read 
in favor of the accused, has a rich history in the United States, but also a 
difficult one as courts have wrestled with the proper scope of the doctrine.5 
Chevron deference, while lacking the older rule’s pedigree, makes up for it by 
being one of the most cited opinions ever, with a vast quantity of judicial and 
academic commentary.6 The distinct values each hold necessarily creates 
pressure when they are brought into dispute.7  
The decision in Esquivel-Quintana aggravates a Circuit split not only in 
what “sexual abuse of a minor” means for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1227, but 
also over the proper level of deference given to the BIA interpretation of 
statutes.8 Past the practical problem of whether Esquivel-Quintanta violated 
§ 1227 and the doctrinal problem of deciding between the rule of lenity and 
Chevron deference, it raises the theoretical dilemma of how a lower court 
receives direction from the Supreme Court in interpreting statutes. The 
majority in Esquivel-Quintana found it difficult to derive a standard from the 
secondhand manner in which the Supreme Court has used Chevron deference 
in decisions involving statutes with both criminal and civil applications.9 Even 
with this difficultly, however, the court was still willing to give a strong 
reading from its understanding of the precedent. The conflict between these 
two rules has already been noted by academic commentators in immigration 
law and other fields.10 The murky nature of Chevron’s relationship with the 
                                                                                                                     
 5 See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 57, 86–122 (1998), for a comprehensive history of the doctrine in the United States. 
 6 See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Symposium, Chevron at 30: Looking 
Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014). 
 7 Cf. Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 1, 61 (2006) (“Chevron deference respects a valid delegation of authority by 
Congress and empowers agencies to achieve their policy goals more easily. The rule of 
lenity, however, protects core constitutional rights—the due process requirement of fair 
warning and the primacy of Congress in defining criminal behavior.”). 
 8 This circuit split has appeared in other BIA readings of criminal statutes. See David 
A. Luigs, Note, The Single-Scheme Exception to Criminal Deportations and the Case for 
Chevron’s Step Two, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1995). 
 9 Cf. Greenfield, supra note 7, at 38; Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of 
Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 559 (2003). 
 10 See, e.g., Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza 
Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 115 (1998); 
Greenfield, supra note 7, at 1; Luigs, supra note 8, at 1105; David S. Rubenstein, Putting 
the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 482 (2007); Slocum, supra note 9, at 515; see also Kristin E. 
Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905 (2007) (dealing with rule 
of lenity and Chevron problems in tax shelter cases); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant 
to Federal Criminal Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 489–90 (1996) (arguing that Chevron 
deference should even be given to the Department of Justice when interpreting criminal 
statutes). 
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rule of lenity, however, is not limited just to immigration. Agencies often 
interpret civil statutes with criminal ramifications that would require courts to 
ask whether to defer or apply the rule of lenity.11 Unfortunately, the level of 
abstraction the majority and dissent reaches in Esquivel-Quintana, treating the 
conflict as a purely doctrinal question, made it more difficult to solve as there 
is no good comprehensive rule on when lenity should overrule Chevron.12 
Instead of giving a simple reading of the statute, the Supreme Court could use 
this or a similar case to give lower courts direction on the use of Chevron 
deference when the agency goes against the traditional tools of statutory 
construction. 
This Case Comment will show how a simple statutory construction 
problem created a myriad of solutions. Part II will describe how the case 
arrived at the Sixth Circuit and how the majority handled it in a doctrinal 
manner that opens up this debate. Part III will look at the passionate dissent by 
Judge Sutton challenging the underlying values found in the opinion and how 
his argument relates to the current academic commentary on the subject. Part 
IV will look at how other circuits have dealt with this specific issue, showing 
the divergent ways courts could decide cases where an agency interprets a 
statute with criminal and civil elements and how distinct the court’s reasoning 
in Esquivel-Quintana appears compared to its peers. Part V will explain how 
this multitude of options makes it difficult to predict how a future Supreme 
Court would handle all the issues raised in the case—such as how to interpret 
§ 1227 and § 1101—using the level of deference given to the BIA in 
interpreting those statutes, and whether the rule of lenity applies to situations 
where a statute has both criminal and civil outcomes. 
II. ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA AT THE AGENCY AND THE COURTS 
The path taken by the BIA and the Sixth Circuit’s review of that order 
shows different approaches. The agency interprets the statute on the basis of 
the Board’s precedent. The majority, instead of parroting the Board or de novo 
reviewing the statute, sees itself constrained by the Chevron doctrine. 
A. Board of Immigration Appeal 
Juan Esquivel-Quintana was arrested and convicted of violating section 
261.5(c) of the California Penal Code13 in 2009 for having sexual relations 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Greenfield, supra note 7, at 5 (pointing out the dilemma can be found in EPA, 
OSHA, SEC, BOP, and NLRB cases).  
 12 Greenfield, supra note at 7, at 61 (“It is important, therefore, to approach the 
problem not simply as an abstract debate over methods of statutory interpretation, but as a 
conflict between two policies that serve distinct sets of values.”). 
 13 “Any person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor 
who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor 
or a felony . . . .” CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(c) (West 2014). 
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with a girl at least 3 years younger than himself.14 In 2013, after he moved to 
Michigan, an Immigration Judge held that this conviction made Esquivel-
Quintana removable because it constituted an “aggravated felony,” which, 
under federal law, is cause for civil deportation.15 The statute’s definition 
section for “aggravated felony” includes the dispositive phrase “sexual abuse 
of a minor” without further explanation.16  
Lacking a statutory definition of “sexual abuse of a minor,” the Board 
turned to its own precedent.17 In an earlier decision, In re Rodriguez-
Rodriguez, the BIA concluded that it did not necessarily need to give a definite 
meaning to “sexual abuse of a minor” on the basis of any prior federal 
statute.18 The BIA instead decided to be merely “guided” by a federal statutory 
definition for sexual abuse dealing with the proper treatment of child victims 
testifying at their abusers’ trials.19 The Board in Esquivel-Quintanta on the 
basis of this earlier decision, concluded that while sixteen- or seventeen-year-
olds might not always be included in the definition of “minor” for the purposes 
of § 1227, they would be if the state includes a reasonable age difference in its 
statute.20 The Californian statute stated a victim had to be more than “three 
years younger than the perpetrator,” so the statute passed the Board’s test—
Esquivel-Quintana’s victim was a minor.21 As such, the BIA upheld the 
Immigration Judge’s decision. 
B. The Sixth Circuit and the Chevron Doctrine 
The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Boggs, upheld the BIA’s 
decision, structuring its analysis on Chevron deference.22 As laid out by the 
Supreme Court, the Chevron doctrine requires courts to follow a two-step 
process: first, ask if the law specifically speaks on an issue and then, if it does 
not, ask whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible reading of that 
ambiguity.23 The Supreme Court already held that the BIA is allowed to make 
basic asylum decisions,24 partially on the basis of Chevron.25 The Sixth Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 14 In re Esquivel-Quintana, 26 I & N Dec. 469, 470 (B.I.A. 2015). 
 15 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 16 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2012). 
 17 In re Esquivel-Quintana, 26 I & N Dec. at 470. 
 18 In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I & N Dec. 991, 994 (BIA 1999). 
 19 Id. at 995–96. The term “sexual abuse” includes “the employment, use, persuasion, 
inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to 
engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of 
sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) 
(1994)). 
 20 In re Esquivel-Quintana, 26 I & N Dec. at 475. 
 21 Id. at 477. 
 22 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1021–22. 
 23 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).  
 24 INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam). 
 25 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999). 
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also noted that three other circuits have already applied Chevron analysis to 
the BIA’s definition of sexual abuse.26 However, there is a circuit split on 
whether nonprecedential BIA opinions deserve deference.27 The Sixth Circuit 
directly disagreed with the Fourth and Ninth Circuit decisions by holding that 
unpublished BIA precedent deserves Chevron deference. “There is not ‘a 
single case in which a general conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative 
authority has been held insufficient to support Chevron deference for an 
exercise of that authority within the agency’s substantive field.’”28 Applying 
this framework, the Court moved on to analyze the petitioner’s argument. The 
Sixth Circuit quickly ruled out creating a definitive “generic-definition” for 
sexual abuse of a minor because the Petitioner had built this argument around 
a case dealing with an easily distinguishable statute.29 The Court also rejected 
Esquivel-Quintana’s preferred interpretation of “minor”—relying on 18 U.S.C. 
§ 224330—as unreasonable, pointing out that using it would limit the definition 
of “minor” to children over the age of twelve.31 
C. A Tale of Two Footnotes 
The Court outlined the benefits of applying the rule of lenity to statutes 
with criminal and civil applications,32 which includes stopping agencies from 
creating new crimes through enforcement, ensures the legislature creates 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1022 (citing Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 
774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); Restrepo v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 617 F.3d 787, 796 (3d Cir. 
2010); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013)). 
 29 Id. at 1022–23 (deciding a “generic” meaning was created for robbery in Taylor v. 
U.S., 495 U.S. 575 (1990), on the basis of legislative history of the particular law in 
question). 
 30 The statute states: 
(a) Of a Minor.—Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which 
persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with 
the head of any Federal department or agency, knowingly engages in a sexual act with 
another person who— 
(1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and 
(2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; 
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, 
or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (2012). 
 31 Id. at 1025–26. 
 32 Oddly, neither the majority nor dissent considered the statutory canon presumption 
against deportation (the immigration rule of lenity) as being distinguishable from the 
criminal rule of lenity. See Rubenstein, supra note 10, at 491 (arguing the immigration rule 
of lenity is weaker than the criminal one) cf. Slocum, supra note 9, at 519–22 (tracing the 
history of the immigration rule of lenity through Supreme Court precedent). 
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criminal statutes, and leaves courts as the final arbitrator of what criminal 
statutes mean.33 Despite commending the rule of lenity, the Court considered 
itself constrained by a footnote in the Supreme Court decision Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, which seemed to limit the 
application of the rule of lenity.34 Meanwhile, a later footnote that appeared in 
Leocal v. Ashcroft, while a strong statement in support of rule of lenity, was 
dismissed by the Sixth Circuit as dicta.35 That Court did not consider the 
Lecoal footnote to have any effect on their reading of Babbit or at least not 
enough to overturn what it claimed to be an explicit directive from the 
Supreme Court.36 
III. DISSENTING ARGUMENTS 
In his opinion, Judge Sutton limits how much he really disagrees with the 
majority, going so far as to concur in part instead of directly dissenting.37 
However, his criticism of the court’s use of Chevron is harsh, writing that its 
use challenges the separation of powers principle by allowing an agency to 
enforce and interpret a law.38 Sutton starts his disagreement by arguing that a 
statute with criminal and civil application must be given only one 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1023–24. 
 34 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 
(1995). The footnote, after listing the value of rule of lenity concluded:  
We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for 
reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing 
statute authorizes criminal enforcement. Even if there exist regulations whose 
interpretations of statutory criminal penalties provide such inadequate notice of 
potential liability as to offend the rule of lenity, the “harm” regulation, which has 
existed for two decades and gives a fair warning of its consequences, cannot be one of 
them.  
Id. 
 35 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004). There, the court stated: 
Even if § 16 lacked clarity on this point, we would be constrained to interpret any 
ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor. Although here we deal with § 16 in the 
deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and 
noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether 
we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity 
applies. 
Id. 
 36 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1024 (“While the Court has begun to distance itself 
from Babbitt, we do not read dicta in Leocal and subsequent cases as overruling Babbitt, or 
requiring that we apply the rule of lenity here in Esquivel-Quintana’s civil removal 
proceeding. As an ‘inferior’ court, our job is to adhere faithfully to the Supreme Court’s 
precedents.”). 
 37 Id. at 1027 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 38 Id. 
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interpretation—the criminal law construction.39 On whether or not California’s 
definition of statutory rape is included under federal law, Sutton notes that the 
circuit split must mean the federal law is, at least, ambiguous on this point.40 
Sutton goes on to point out the definition of “minor” in other federal statute 
involving sexual abuse has contradictory meanings—in one case where the 
victim must be under sixteen-years-old, but eighteen in another.41 Further, 
Sutton contends that “sexual abuse” might qualify the meaning of minor in a 
way that would otherwise mean persons under the age of eighteen.42 Having 
shown that there must be ambiguity in the interpretation, Sutton goes on to 
explain that lenity, not Chevron deference to the BIA’s conclusion, should be 
the controlling decider for that ambiguity.43 For him, the Court deciding 
otherwise reads too much into one footnote.44 
Judge Sutton tries to quell fears about “the potential sticker shock of 
transforming a government-always-wins canon (Chevron) into a government-
always-loses canon (rule of lenity).”45 He gives a highly nuanced approach 
where “ambiguity” might mean one thing for Chevron analysis, and another 
for the rule of lenity.46 This approach would allow for some agency 
interpretations of statutes to not necessarily require rule of lenity analysis if 
those statutes are not ambiguous for the specific purposes of the rule of 
lenity.47 Judge Sutton’s difficulty in choosing one definition for “ambiguity” 
might underscore an innate problem with the statutory canons. Scholars 
challenge whether the canons are by themselves comprehensive enough to 
create clear results.48 Canons are often too generalized to help without 
precedent to establish the meaning of statutory language as they “ignore 
crucial differences in structure that characterize modern legislation.”49 The 
                                                                                                                     
 39 Id. at 1028. Sutton’s argument closely tracks the statement made by Justice Scalia 
in Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014) (statement respecting the denial of 
certiorari). In that statement, Scalia expressed that he agreed with the denial because he 
thought Whitman would serve as “a poor setting in which to reach the question.” Id. at 354. 
But he concluded that the Court should accept a case with the proper question. Id. Judge 
Sutton likely thinks Esquivel-Quintana serves as that case. See also Carter v. Welles-
Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 729–36 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 40 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1029 (Sutton, J., dissenting). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1030. 
 45 Id. at 1031. 
 46 Esquivel-Quintana, 810 F.3d at 1031 (“If American Inuits have more than one way 
to describe snow, American lawyers may have more than one way to describe 
ambiguity.”). 
 47 Id.; see also Greenfield, supra note 7, at 14–15 (outlining the different levels of 
ambiguity the rule of lenity had been applied to before).  
 48 James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest 
for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2005). 
 49 Edward L. Rubin, Symposium, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of 
Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579, 586 (1992). 
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lack of precedent that so bothered the majority opinion that it felt constrained 
to find against Esquivel-Quintana, might be the same reason Sutton tries to 
supply a formless guidance on how to direct lower courts to use the rule of 
lenity situations. Yet, his thesis taps into the ongoing academic debate. 
Commentators dealing with the Chevron and lenity contradiction have 
suggested that lenity should be applied either at “step one” on whether the 
statute is ambiguous or at “step two” where the question is whether the 
construction offered by the agency is permissible.50 If a step one approach was 
adopted, a court would interpret a statute to have the clear congressional intent 
of having lenity read into it, removing the ambiguity for the agency to have 
interpreted.51 Under a step two approach, it would serve as a factor to take into 
account as to whether the agency’s reading was acceptable.52 Finally, there has 
been one suggestion that the rule of lenity only serves a role after a court 
concludes that an agency, by giving an unreasonable interpretation, failed 
Chevron at step two. At that point, the court would independently interpret the 
statute and therefore would use the rule of lenity.53 While Judge Sutton does 
not adopt any of these approaches in his dissent, they do follow his idea that 
lenity has a role to play even when an agency is meant to be the main 
interpreter of a statute.  
IV. OTHER CIRCUITS, OTHER REASONING 
The approach adopted by the majority and the dissent in Esquivel-
Quintana is just a small sliver on how to handle the Board’s interpretation of 
“sexual abuse of a minor.” While academic commentators have been quick to 
notice the divergence between rule of lenity and Chevron deference, the other 
Circuits have expressed multiple methods on how to interpret the statutes at 
issue in Esquivel-Quintana. What might be surprising is how none of them 
expressly deal with the rule of lenity.  
The Ninth Circuit in its reading of § 1101(a) refused to give Chevron 
deference to “unpublished, non-precedential” BIA orders.54 The court 
considered Rodriguez-Rodriguez to be a guide to read “sexual abuse of a 
minor” instead of a definite interpretation that could be given Chevron 
deference.55 Instead, it created its own generic definition of the term “sexual 
abuse of a minor” to be followed by the agency.56 Like the Ninth Circuit, the 
                                                                                                                     
 50 Rubenstein, supra note 10, at 482; Slocum, supra note 9, at 577 (“This proposal 
would modify lenity somewhat from a dispositive tiebreaker canon to a canon that acts as a 
factor.”); see also Greenfield, supra note 7, at 47–51. 
 51 Luigs, supra note 8, at 1131 n.110. 
 52 Slocum, supra note 9, at 576–77. 
 53 Rubenstein, supra note 10, at 518. 
 54 Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 55 Id. at 1157. 
 56 Id. at 1158. The court lists the elements of “sexual abuse of a minor” to be met to 
reach the statutory definition: “(1) a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with 
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Fourth Circuit “conclude[d] that the BIA did not adopt in Rodriguez-
Rodriguez a particular definition of the generic federal crime of ‘sexual abuse 
of a minor’ for application of Subsection A.”57 Holding that the BIA’s 
interpretation was only entitled to Skidmore deference, the Court went on to 
reverse the BIA’s decision for removal.58 The Fifth Circuit decided that a plain 
reading of the statute included the petitioner’s actions.59 It also concluded that 
while Chevron step one might be met by the BIA’s reading of the statute, step 
two failed because BIA’s construction went against the Circuit’s precedent for 
statutory construction.60 For its part, the Seventh Circuit rejected these 
approaches, believing that the Supreme Court precedent dictated that agencies 
can choose between rulemaking and adjudication to apply Chevron deference 
to agency adjudication like the guidance found in Rodriguez-Rodriguez.61 
Sexual abuse of a minor would have to be determined by a common law 
approach best left to the BIA, not the courts.62 None of these cases expressly 
considered the rule of lenity.  
V. THE PATH(S) AHEAD 
The Sixth Circuit staking its analysis completely on Chevron instead of a 
de novo reading of the statute could provide a unique challenge to the 
Supreme Court on the meaning of the doctrine if it was to review the case. The 
Supreme Court might otherwise give an equivocal answer where they upheld 
the removal on the basis of the plain meaning of the statute, without expressly 
saying if Chevron deference was necessary. It might also adopt the Ninth 
Circuit approach where courts do not adopt an agency’s “guidance” on what a 
statute means, but only a bright-line rule with specific boundaries to categorize 
behavior.63 It could adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that the BIA can 
take a common law approach in enforcing the statute.64 However, the Court 
has recently made a strong statement that an agency interpretation of criminal 
statutes does not deserve deference.65 It might consider including civil–
criminal statutes within that category. There is reason to suspect that even a 
favorable decision against the use of Chevron deference would not overturn 
the ruling, as happened in the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court recently 
                                                                                                                     
a minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age difference of at least four years 
between the defendant and the minor.” 
 57 Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 520 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 58 Id. at 521. 
 59 Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 60 Id. at 293. 
 61 Velasco-Giron v. Holder, 773 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 64 Velasco-Giron, 773 F.3d at 779. 
 65 Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014). (“Whether the 
Government interprets a criminal statute too broadly (as it sometimes does) or too 
narrowly . . . a court has an obligation to correct its error.”). 
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restated a very narrow standard for applying the rule of lenity—it is only to be 
used where, “after considering text, structure, history and purpose, there 
remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court 
must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” 66 The Supreme Court could 
conclude that even under a lenity approach, Esquivel-Quintana was removable 
because of his prior conviction. The recent passing of Justice Scalia casts even 
more uncertainty on how the Supreme Court would handle this case, as he was 
one of the strongest voices on the Supreme Court supporting the use of the rule 
of lenity in Chevron situations.67 However, a pure review of Esquivel-
Quintana will likely require the Court to settle the “debate” between the 
footnotes in Babbit and Leocal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
No matter the Supreme Court’s stance, the Sixth Circuit has opened a 
Pandora’s Box about the nature of statutory construction and the canons of 
interpretation. While wrestling with mixed messages from the Supreme Court, 
the Sixth Circuit ironically felt constrained into making an expansive 
statement on the powers agencies hold over immigrants facing deportation. 
This strong statement will likely make it more difficult for lenity to overrule 
Chevron in future Sixth Circuit cases involving other agencies—showing that 
the tools of statutory construction, as forged and shaped by the Supreme Court, 
are often as malleable or rigid as the lower courts choose to see them.  
                                                                                                                     
 66 Id. at 2272 n.10 (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013)). 
 67 See Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014) (Scalia, J., statement 
respecting denial of certiorari, joined by Thomas, J.) (“Babbit’s drive-by ruling, in short, 
deserves little weight.”); Greenfield, supra note 7, at 6. 
